

Albero CFD simulation study

Model prepared with inspiration from actual ferry


Car T-PRD release with delayed ignition evaluated as "worst credible event" Release direction down and backwards (from below car) and up simulated Release flow restriction orifice 2.5mm assumed (sensitivity with 1.5mm)

Car deck:


- Free elevation 2.5m (total 3.0m, 0.5m beams/piping/armatures)
- Cars realistically distributed across entire deck (8 car lanes)

Truck deck:

- Free elevation 4.6m (total 5.1m, 0.5m beams as for cars)
- Cars lanes near leak similar (minor differences to car deck)
- Trucks in adjacent lanes



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
Lloyd's Register

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Albero CFD simulation study

T-PRD release from FC-car

- Relevant cars have 2 or 3 tanks and 4-6.3 kg hydrogen
- Based on information worst-case size of tank is assumed 75L @ 700 bar i.e. 3.1 kg @ 15°C
- With 2.5mm T-PRD orifice this gives initial release rate 160 g/s
- Sensitivity with 1.5mm T-PRD orifice (60 g/s) performed for downwards car release





Albero CFD study – Overview simulations


• Dispersion simulation (3.1 kg tank), explosion simulation with ignition at 2s, 5s, 10s and 30s (cars only)


- 101302 is sensitivity simulation to 100302 with reduced flow restriction orifice to 1.5mm
- 100302# is sensitivity simulation to 100302 using preliminary version of car configuration

Jobno	Geometry	Orifice	Leak	Explosion 2s	Explosion 5s	Explosion 10s	Explosion 30s
100301	Car deck	2.5mm	Rear	120301	150301	110301	130301
100302	Car deck	2.5mm	Down	120302	150302	110302	130302
100303	Car deck	2.5mm	Up	120303	150303	110303	130303
101302	Car deck	<mark>1.5mm</mark>	Down	121302	151302	111302	131302
200301	Truck deck	2.5mm	Rear	220301	250301	210301	
200302	Truck deck	2.5mm	Down	220302	250302	210302	
200303	Truck deck	2.5mm	Up	220303	250303	210303	
100302#	<mark>Test sim car deck</mark>	2.5mm	Down		105302#	110302#	














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



























Albero CFD study – Explosion pressures 30 seconds

Reported pressures Monitor 15


Maximum explosion pressures around 10 mbar

Car deck

Much lower pressures than with earlier ignition
 Truck deck

- Not simulated, would give even less pressures

No loads of significant concern




- Albero CFD study Explosion pressures Lloyd's Register • Reported pressures early "Appetizer simulation" Overpressures of 250mbar (5s) and 300 mbar (10s). 0.20 Cars laterally placed too close to wall (45cm) and adjacent _ 0.15 car(25cm), "square tires" and coincidences regarding car (pard) 0.10 placement, led to >2x larger reactive clouds which were also strongly confined between walls/deck and car. 0.05 Predicted pressure levels could represent risk to people as 0.0 they may fall over and get hurt by impact. 250 mbar is 5.0 TIME /* sometimes defined as eardrum rupture threshold. Run: 105302 Var: P Avoid parking FC-vehicles very close to walls and vehicles _ 0.30 0.25 0.20 0.15 (barg) 0.10 0.05 0.00 -0.0 10.10 TIME (s) 10.00 10.05 10.15 10.20 Run: 110302 Var: P
 - Albero CFD study dispersion simulation videos


Car deck release backwards


Concentration above 8% shown


3D volume visualization is not always 100% accurate, transparency and grid resolution may give some smearing



































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
Albero CFD study – summary videos

• Reflections regarding risk for fatalities and damage

- Risk to people is primarily related to flame exposure and high pressures
- If people would be inside flames shown in videos this could be dangerous. Flame temperatures of the lean flames shown are mostly moderate (rather 700°C than 1000°C), and flames consist of water vapour which is not toxic. For comparison hydrocarbon flames at LFL-concentration are 1300°C and may be toxic (e.g. CO₂ and CO). Due to a very short duration of flame/heat exposure, burns may be expected on exposed skin, but it can be assumed that fatalities from flame exposure would be rare.
- Fatality risk from explosion pressures below 100 mbar of short duration should be limited. In the
 flame zone near the release higher pressures (100-200+ mbar + reflected onto deck/wall) can be seen
 very locally, these should also not represent any major risk, but a moderate fatality risk can be feared
 if people are at the core of explosion and pushed off their feet. Beyond 10m away from explosion
 pressures will be lower and may shake people but should not represent any fatality risk. Due to the
 confined deck repeated shock waves can be expected across the entire deck.
- Neither flames nor pressures should represent any risk for damage to ferry deck, some local damage to cars may be possible (glass damage).
- Based on the above the risk potential for the various scenarios can be interpreted from the various videos.

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Albero CFD study – conclusions



- Due to the large volume of the car deck relative to the released amount of gas, the high release velocity, and the quickly reducing release rate when tank pressure reduces, the primary hazard is related to ignition within the first 10-15s.
- Hazards for truck deck releases are generally lower than for the narrower car deck, for early ignition for downwards/rear releases hazards could be similar.
- Like seen from the initial test simulation cars placed very close together and close to the wall could lead to worse explosions and a more significant risk. The same applies with lower ceiling and cars placed in corners. Thus, it would be recommended to ensure certain minimum distances around FC-vehicles to adjacent cars.
- A reduced T-PRD orifice (1.5mm compared to 2.5mm, initial release rate reduced from 160 g/s to 60 g/s, tank 90% empty within 140s rather than 50s) gives a very significant reduction of explosion consequences.
- The worst-case scenario studied (T-PRD release with delayed ignition) is assumed unlikely, but possible. In most cases where T-PRD would open there is already a fire, and immediate ignition could be expected, resulting in a more local jet-fire rather than flashfire and explosion.

Tank rupture scenarios with immediate or slightly delayed ignition, is another category worst-case scenarios not considered. Those would normally be a result of an extended fire with failing T-PRD, thus no people should be nearby in a closed car deck. Such scenarios could be modelled, to understand possible risks to vessel and fire-fighters. For such a severe fire scenario all types of fuel tanks will represent a major risk.

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